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Justice through Armed Groups’ Governance – An Oxymoron?
Jan Willms
Abstract
In this paper, the author addresses the question of whether armed groups’ courts are suitable 
to enforce international humanitarian law. The ensuing question of whether the existence 
of these courts conforms to international law is answered in the affirmative: international 
humanitarian law and human rights law do not in principle prohibit the operation of such 
courts. Adjudication by armed groups has a relatively high potential to deter the groups’ 
fighters from committing violations of international humanitarian law. This is to a large ex-
tent because convictions by armed groups’ courts gain more attention among fighters than 
convictions by national or international criminal courts. However, the empirical record of 
armed groups’ courts is mixed. The African armed groups examined in this paper violated 
international humanitarian law, including due process guarantees. Yet, they showed more 
respect for civilians than many armed groups without their own jurisdiction.
Zusammenfassung
Gegenstand des Arbeitspapiers ist die Frage, ob Rechtsprechung durch bewaffnete Gruppen 
geeignet ist, das humanitäre Völkerrecht durchzusetzen. Die sich daran anschließende Frage, 
ob Gerichte bewaffneter Gruppen selbst überhaupt völkerrechtskonform sind, wird bejaht: 
Grundsätzlich verbieten weder humanitär-völkerrechtliche noch menschenrechtliche Stan-
dards solche Gerichte. Die Rechtsprechung durch bewaffnete Gruppen hat ein vergleichs-
weise hohes Potential, die eigenen Kämpfer von Verletzungen des humanitären Völkerrechts 
abzuschrecken. Dies liegt zu einem großen Teil daran, dass von bewaffneten Gruppen ge-
sprochene Urteile unter den Mitgliedern der entsprechenden Gruppe eine deutlich höhere 
Aufmerksamkeit erregen als Prozesse nationaler oder internationaler Strafgerichte. Aller-
dings ist die Bilanz von Gerichten bewaffneter Gruppen in der Praxis durchwachsen. Die 
Analyse verschiedener afrikanischer bewaffneter Gruppen zeigt, dass Gruppen mit Gerichten 
zwar fundamentale Normen des humanitären Völkerrechts – inklusive Verfahrensgarantien 
– verletzt haben, es jedoch in einem größeren Maße respektieren als viele Gruppen ohne 
eigene Rechtsprechung.
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1. Introduction1
The armed group2 Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC) led by Jean-Pierre Bemba con-
trolled large parts of the North of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) between the 
late 1990’s and 2003. In the beginning the MLC acted fairly responsibly and installed a civilian 
administration. In 2002 and 2003, however, its members committed atrocities in the DRC and 
the Central African Republic. In February 2003, the MLC tried twenty-seven of its members 
for extortion, rape, assassination, looting and disobeying orders.3 The trials took place in the 
headquarters of the MLC in the North of the DRC. The UN peace support operation MONUC 
would have provided planes for defence attorneys from Kinshasa, but the government of the 
DRC prevented them from boarding.4 The verdicts were already delivered one week after the 
beginning of the trial5 and attracted serious criticism. In front of the Security Council, the 
United States condemned three aspects of the trial, namely:
“1. inadequate due process guarantees afforded to the defendants
2. disregard for the serious nature of the crimes, as reflected in the light sentences
 handed down [and]
3. the failure to charge anyone with crimes against humanity or war crimes.”6
Similarly, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, said 
that the trials had not achieved real accountability.7 While the DRC simply obstructed the 
MLC’s trial, the UN and the US were more pragmatic. They did not criticize that an armed 
group had used courts but only the manner in which the MLC had done so.
This example illustrates a basic dilemma. On the one hand, States are usually unwilling to 
accept the operation of a court of an armed group on their territory as the administration of 
justice is considered to be a very important aspect of their sovereignty. On the other hand, the 
international community has a strong interest in the enforcement of international humani-
tarian law, in which armed groups’ courts might play a role.
1 I am grateful to Dieter Fleck, Heike Krieger and Sandesh Sivakumaran for providing comments on 
earlier drafts of this article. I also owe thanks to the participants of the conference on the imple-
mentation of international humanitarian law in contemporary African conflicts in September 2011 
in Potsdam where it was discussed. All possible errors remain, of course, mine.
2 The term is used here for armed non-state actors that at least meet the requirements in Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.
3 Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), DRC: Interview with MLC Leader Jean-Pierre 
Bemba, 6 February 2003, http://www.irinnews.org/fr/reportfrench.aspx?reportid=41456, last ac-
cessed 21 September 2012.
4 IRIN, DRC: MLC Completes Ituri Rights Violations Trials, Subject to Appeal, 27 February 2003, 
http://www.news.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=41827, last accessed 21 September 2012.
5 Ibid.
6 United Nations Security Council (UNSC), 4784th Meeting, S/PV.4784, p. 19 (Mr. Williamson, USA).
7 Ibid.: 3. 
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Can armed groups’ courts be an effective tool for the implementation of justice despite States’ 
concerns about their sovereignty? More precisely, the article will address to what extent armed 
groups courts’ are able to enforce the law applicable during armed conflict, international hu-
manitarian law. In response to that question, it will first be addressed whether armed groups’ 
courts are legal or even required under international humanitarian and human rights law (2.). 
Then the paper will deal with the question whether the prohibition of double jeopardy must 
be applied to ‘judgments’ issued by armed groups’ courts (3.). This will be followed by a more 
empirical analysis whether such courts can contribute to the implementation of humanitar-
ian law (4.) and to what extent they respect fair trial guarantees (5.). Subsequently, the effect of 
armed groups’ courts on the empirical legitimacy of the armed groups possessing them will 
be analyzed (6.). Finally, it will be discussed how the international community should react (7.).
2. The status of armed groups’ courts 
2.1 Are armed groups’ courts prohibited?
Turning to their legal status, armed groups’ courts are normally illegal under a State’s domes-
tic law. In light of the topic of this paper it is more important to focus on their legality under 
international law standards for the protection of individuals. If armed groups’ courts were 
illegal under international law, this would compromise any positive effects such courts might 
have on the implementation of international humanitarian law rules.
2.1.1 International humanitarian law
There are two conventional provisions in international humanitarian law relevant to armed 
groups’ courts: Common Article 3(1)(d) of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (GC) and Article 6 
of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions (Additional Protocol II, AP II). Moreo-
ver, Rule 100 of the Customary Law Study of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) also prescribes that fair trial guarantees apply by means of customary international law 
(Henckaerts/Doswald-Beck 2005: 352). 
International humanitarian law contains no rule that explicitly prohibits courts by armed 
groups. Only Common Article 3 GC, which requires a ‘judgment pronounced by a regularly 
constituted court’, makes one hesitate. By its ordinary meaning, this would seem to mean 
something along the lines of the human rights standard ‘established by law’. If ‘law’ is in-
terpreted as State law only, this could be interpreted as prohibiting armed groups to operate 
courts.8 In particular in the context of humanitarian law, the term ‘law’ could also include law 
by an armed group. Similarly, a court could be ‘regularly constituted’ within the law of the 
armed group. 
8 It will be discussed below whether this is actually the case under human rights law. See Section 2.1.3.
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At any rate, according to the principles of effectiveness and good faith, it would not make sense 
to also apply a norm to non-state actors9 which they cannot possibly comply with. The phrase 
‘regularly constituted court’ has not been reused in Article 6 AP II which indicates that States 
did not place much emphasis on how a court of an armed group is established but were much 
more concerned about fair trial guarantees. 
Customary international humanitarian law does not – according to the ICRC – prohibit armed 
groups’ courts, either. Rule 100 of the ICRC Customary Law Study is formulated in a general 
fashion and does not require a regularly constituted court. The Rule simply reads: “No one 
may be convicted or sentenced, except pursuant to a fair trial affording all essential judicial 
guarantees.” (Henckaerts/Doswald-Beck 2005: 352) Similarly, the Manual of Non-International 
Armed Conflict sets out fair trial guarantees that armed groups in principle can meet (Din-
stein et al. 2006: 51-52).
The above-mentioned US condemnation of the MLC’s too light punishment implicitly sup-
ports the conclusion that armed groups’ courts are not illegal under international humanitar-
ian law.10 Otherwise, the US would absurdly be demanding an act that violates humanitarian 
law in order to punish a violation of the same body of law. The same reasoning can be applied, 
mutatis mutandis, to the following statements. The Security Council urged that “RCD [Rally for 
Congolese Democracy]-GOMA must […] ensure an end to all violations of human rights and 
to impunity in all areas under its control.”11 The Special Rapporteur for the Sudan demanded 
that two armed groups operating in South Sudan “should take the necessary measures with-
out delay to prevent future violations by investigating the cases brought to their attention and 
holding the perpetrators responsible.”12 The Commission of Inquiry for Libya (at a time in 
which the non-international armed conflict was still ongoing13) recommended to the Libyan 
National Transitional Council “to conduct exhaustive, impartial and public investigations into 
all allegations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law viola-
tions […] with full respect of judicial guarantees.”14 These calls on consolidated armed groups 
9 It can hardly be doubted that Common Article 3 GC including its rules on courts formally applies to 
armed groups since the chapeau of that Article is addressed to ‘each Party’. This formal application 
is dealt with in more detail by Sivakumaran (2009: 495-498).
10 See above note 6 and corresponding text.
11 UNSC Presidential Statement 22 (23 July 2002), para. 4.
12 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Sudan (20 February 1996) UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/1996/62, para. 87.
13 It is not necessary to dwell on the question of the qualification of the conflict. In order to identify 
the Commission’s opinion on the applicability of human rights law to armed groups, it is sufficient 
to note that the Commission qualified the conflict as non-international and referred to the National 
Transitional Council as a ‘dissident armed group’ in the sense of Additional Protocol II. Report of 
the International Commission of Inquiry to Investigate All Alleged Violations of International Hu-
man Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1 June 2011) UN Doc. A/HRC/17/44, paras. 60-65. At 
any rate, as Dapo Akande (2011) rightly pointed out, the recognition of the NTC as the ‘legitimate 
governing authority in Libya’ did not take place before 15 July 2011. 
14 Commission of Inquiry Libya, above note 13, para. 269.
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to investigate crimes in situations of armed conflict support the conclusion that international 
humanitarian law does not prohibit such courts.
2.1.2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Since Article 8(2)(c)(iv) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) is by and large 
simply a criminalized version of common Article 3, it is not surprising that Article 8(2)(c)(iv) 
does not forbid armed groups’ courts, either. In the ICC Elements of Crimes a “regularly con-
stituted court” is defined as a court “affording the essential guarantees of independence and 
impartiality”; and independence and impartiality are standards that courts by armed groups 
are in principle able to meet. Whilst this interpretation in the ICC Elements of Crimes seems 
to confuse regular constitution with fair trial guarantees, it is the most authoritative interpre-
tation. The ICC’s jurisprudence in the Bemba case also confirms that armed groups’ courts are 
not illegal. Before the decision on confirming or declining charges, Amnesty International 
submitted Amicus Curiae observations. Therein Amnesty argued that Bemba could not use 
a court of an armed group in order to avoid command responsibility. Amnesty reasoned that 
such a court does not meet the human rights standard ‘established by law’ and is not able to 
provide for a fair trial.15 Pre-Trial Chamber II did not share this view. On the contrary, it es-
tablished command responsibility on the basis that Bemba’s armed group had a ‘functional 
military judicial system’ which was not used.16 This clearly confirms the interpretation that 
armed groups are able to meet the requirements in Article 8(2)(c)(iv) ICC Statute. Otherwise, 
the ICC would encourage war crimes.
2.1.3 Human rights law
Courts of armed groups are not prohibited under international humanitarian law. But what 
is the status of these courts under human rights law? The first question that arises is whether 
armed groups are bound by human rights law at all. Although still very controversial, there is 
growing international practice and an increasing tendency in literature that speaks in favour 
of such an application, especially for jus cogens norms17 as well as in cases where armed groups 
control territory and/or exercise quasi-governmental authority.18 This is supported by a variety 
of arguments. One is in essence functional: “[A]s an insurrectionary movement takes con-
trol over territory and establishes an administration, it [...] automatically assumes the human 
15 Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo (Amicus Curiae Observations on Superior Responsibility submitted pur-
suant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence) ICC-01/05-01/08-406 (20 April 2009), paras. 
22-23.
16 Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo (Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute) ICC-
01/05-01/08 (15 June 2009), para. 501.
17 First Report of the Committee on Non State Actors, ‘Non-state Actors in International Law: Aims, 
Approach and Scope of Project and Legal Issues’ in International Law Association Report on the 
Seventy Fourth Conference (The Hague 2010) para. 3.2; Bellal et al. (2011: 72-73). 
18 This view is found in a large number of UN reports. See e.g. The Report of the United Nations Fact-
Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (25 September 2009) UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48, para. 305; Report 
of the International Commission of Inquiry to investigate all alleged violations of international hu-
man rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (1 June 2011) UN Doc. A/HRC/17/44, para. 72.
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rights obligations resting on the territory.” (Hessbruegge 2005: 40-41)19 Others base themselves 
on State practice and opinio juris (Tomuschat 2004). It cannot be said with certainty whether 
practice has crystallized into a clear-cut obligation of armed groups to respect human rights. 
However, such a duty is developing. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the right to a fair trial applies to armed groups’ courts, the courts 
would have to be ‘competent’ or ‘established by law’.20 Whilst the Human Rights Committee 
declined to pronounce itself on the constitutionality of a court,21 Nowak states the following:
“Both conditions [‘competent’ and ‘established by law’] are to ensure that the ju-
risdictional power of a tribunal is determined generally and independent of the 
given case, i.e. not arbitrarily by a specific administrative act. The term ‘law’ is […] 
to be understood in the strict sense of a parliamentary statute or an equivalent 
unwritten norm of common law, which must be accessible to all persons subject 
to it.” (2005: 319)22
Especially where armed groups wish to pass their own laws, many of them find it impossible 
to meet the requirement of a ‘parliamentary statute’. If armed groups were bound by a human 
rights norm they were not able to meet “such a rule [...] [would] not be complied with and it 
[...] [would] undermine the credibility and protecting effect of other rules.”23 This would run 
counter to the principal reason that motivates deliberations on how armed groups could be 
bound by human rights law, i.e. the protection gap for populations living under its control 
(Bellal et al. 2011: 70). It would therefore seem reasonable to functionally interpret the require-
ment of a parliamentary statute for new laws of armed groups. Indeed, the ‘established by 
law’ condition has been flexibly interpreted outside the domestic law context.24 The European 
Court of Human Rights held that courts of a non-state entity unrecognized by the interna-
tional community could in principle meet the ‘established by law’ condition: 
19 This is a very expansive interpretation of General Comment 26. It is stated in the Comment that 
the “rights enshrined in the Covenant belong to the people living in the territory of the State party.” 
However, in all cases enumerated thereafter States still have the authority. See General Comment on 
Issues Relating to the Continuity of Obligations to the International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights (General Comment 26), Human Rights Committee, 8 December 1997, UN Doc. CPR/C/21/
Rev.1/Add.8/Rev. 1, para. 4.
20 Article 14(1) ICCPR; Article 7(1)(a) African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. The African Court 
for Human and Peoples’ Rights has not dealt with the right to a competent court yet. 
21 Fals Borda et al. v. Colombia, (46/1979) Human Rights Committee, 27 July 1982, para. 13.3.
22 For a similar definition see the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: Coëme et al. 
v. Belgium (Judgment) Application No. 32492/96 (18 October 2000) para. 98.
23 Sassòli makes this point in the context of international humanitarian law (2010: 16). 
24 In Tadić ‘established by law’ was held to mean ‘established according to the rule of law’ in an inter-
national law context. Prosecutor v. Tadić (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction) IT-94-1-AR72 (2 October 1995), para. 45.
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“In certain circumstances, a court belonging to the judicial system of an entity not 
recognised under international law may be regarded as a tribunal ‘established by 
law’ provided that it forms part of a judicial system operating on a ‘constitutional 
and legal basis’ reflecting a judicial tradition compatible with the Convention, in 
order to enable individuals to enjoy the Convention guarantees.”25
Admittedly, the European Court of Human Rights held this with regard to consolidated de 
facto regimes with a higher degree of organization than most armed groups (Turkish Republic 
of Northern Cyprus and the Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria). However, it is still re-
markable that the European Court of Human Rights which can only adjudicate human rights 
violations attributable to States allows at all for that possibility. Moreover, the Commission of 
Inquiry for Libya26 and the Security Council27 considered that human rights law applied to the 
Libyan National Transitional Council and the Rally for Congolese Democracy GOMA, respec-
tively, and called for accountability measures by these armed groups. Hence, if human rights 
law applied to armed groups, it would not per se prohibit that they have courts.
2.2 The possible duty of armed groups to investigate and prosecute
We have seen that international law rules on the protection of individuals do not prohibit 
armed groups to operate courts. The next question, then, is whether armed groups are obliged 
to investigate and prosecute war crimes. If armed groups were under a duty to investigate and 
prosecute, this would strengthen the role of their courts as a tool for implementation. The 
duty to investigate and prosecute is enshrined in international humanitarian and interna-
tional criminal law but can also be deduced from human rights law.28
25 Ilaşcu et al. v. Moldova and Russia (Judgment) Application No. 4877/99, European Court of Human 
Rights, 8 July 2004, paras. 455-464. See also Cyprus v. Turkey (Judgment) Application No. 25781/94, 
European Court of Human Rights, 10 May 2001, paras. 231, 236-237. For criticism of this interpreta-
tion see in particular Cyprus v. Turkey, this note, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Palm Joined by 
Judges Jungwiert, Levits, Pantiru, Kovler and Marcus-Helmons, 101, at 101-105 and Cyprus v. Turkey, 
this note, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Marcus-Helmons, 119, at 119-124. 
26 Report Commission Libya, above note 13, paras. 72 (human rights), 269 (accountability).
27 UNSC Presidential Statement 22, above note 11, and corresponding text.
28 If we accepted that it applied to armed groups, an obligation to investigate a certain human rights 
law violation could also be basis for a duty to investigate a particular war crime if the two crimes 
have the same underlying offence. The Human Rights Committee has for example developed the 
obligation to investigate violations of the right to life: Amirov v. Russian Federation (1447/2006), Hu-
man Rights Committee, 2 April 2009, paras. 11.2-11.4. A violation of the right to life during armed 
conflict could at the same time be a violation of international humanitarian law. However, there is 
no obligation to investigate under human rights law that specifically encompasses all war crimes. 
Moreover, the relationship between international humanitarian and human rights law needs to be 
borne in mind, although there seem to be no inherent conflicts between the duties to investigate in 
both branches of law. For the last point see the Report of the Committee of Independent Experts in 
International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law to Monitor and Assess any Domestic, Legal or 
Other Proceedings Undertaken by Both the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Side, in the 
Light of General Assembly Resolution 64/254, Including the Independence, Effectiveness, Genuine-
ness of these Investigations and their Conformity with International Standards (23 September 2010) 
UN Doc. A/HRC/15/50, para. 29; Schmitt (2011: 54).
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Treaty-based international humanitarian law only obliges States to investigate war crimes.29 
Similarly, it would not be easy to contend that customary international humanitarian law 
imposes a duty to investigate and prosecute for all armed groups. Even the ICRC Customary 
Law Study, sometimes criticized for demanding too much of non-state actors (Sassòli 2010: 
17), finds an obligation to investigate and prosecute in Rule 158 only for States (Henckaerts/
Doswald-Beck 2005: 558).30 George Abi-Saab’s contention in his separate opinion in the Tadić 
case that the grave breaches provisions applied in non-international armed conflict31 did not 
include an explicit claim that armed groups should be bound by it. It might also be that he 
only considered States and de facto regimes, like those that operated in the former Yugoslavia, 
to be the addressees of the grave breaches provisions.
However, the examples quoted above32 could indicate a trend towards an obligation to investi-
gate and prosecute for well-consolidated armed groups that control territory. The Goldstone 
Report even held (at least for Gaza) that any de facto authority exercising government-like func-
tions was under an obligation to prosecute the members of armed groups in the territory 
under its control, seemingly regardless of whether they are affiliated to the de facto authority 
or not:
“[T]he Gaza authorities are responsible for ensuring that effective measures for 
accountability for violations of IHRL [international human rights law] and IHL 
[international humanitarian law] committed by armed groups acting in or from 
the Gaza Strip are established. The Mission points out that such responsibility 
would continue to rest on any authority exercising government-like functions in 
the Gaza Strip.”33
This somewhat limited practice does not allow to claim with certainty whether or not an ob-
ligation to investigate and prosecute exists for armed groups, let alone whether armed groups 
are obliged to set up courts. Arguably, such a rule would not be realistic for all armed groups.34
29 See in particular the grave breaches regime. Geneva Convention I, Article 49; Geneva Convention II, 
Article 50; Geneva Convention III, Article 129; Geneva Convention IV, Article 146.
30 For support of the Rule see Schmitt (2011: 44-45). 
31 Prosecutor v. Tadić, above note 24, Separate Opinion of Judge Abi-Saab. For a sceptical view of Abi 
Saab’s opinion see Moir (2009: 787). 
32 See above notes 4 and 11 through 14 and corresponding text. Admittedly, the practice with regard to 
Libya (above note 13) and Sudan (above note 12) are only recommendations. 
33 Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (25 September 2009) UN 
Doc. A/HRC/12/48, p. 509 (emphasis added). It is not clear whether the Goldstone Report imposes a 
duty to investigate for all de facto authorities (or regimes). The case of Gaza is particular, especially 
since the hostilities are often classified as an international armed conflict. The Goldstone Report is 
ambiguous in that regard and seems to acknowledge that the armed conflict has both international 
and non-international elements (Ibid.: 87). However, the subsequent Tomuschat Report claims that 
the armed conflict had clearly been classified as international in nature; Report of the Committee of 
Independent Experts, above note 28, para. 18.
34 In a similar context, Sassòli doubts whether armed groups are able to conduct habeas corpus proceed-
ings (2010: 17).
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Assuming that the ICRC is correct in claiming that States are always under an obligation to 
investigate in non-international armed conflicts, whereas armed groups are not necessarily 
obligated to do so, would that not violate the principle of equality of belligerents?35 If States 
engage in practice by which they bind themselves with a duty to investigate and prosecute in 
non-international armed conflict without at the same time compelling armed groups to do so, 
those States would be inconsistent when subsequently criticizing this variance in obligations. 
There might be exceptions for States that did not participate in the practice and that persis-
tently objected to their duty to investigate and prosecute.36 
From a lex ferenda point of view, the principle of equality of belligerents is of very high impor-
tance and should be defended against those who generally question its relevance.37 However, 
it would not necessarily be detrimental to the observance of humanitarian law if a State were 
under a duty to investigate and prosecute, whereas an armed group that is unable to meet such 
an obligation were not.
So far, it has only been considered whether a primary rule exists that compels armed groups 
to investigate and prosecute war crimes. Let us now turn to the question whether a secondary 
rule, i.e. command responsibility, obligates commanders to use courts. Pursuant to Article 28 
of the ICC Statute military commanders in any kind of armed conflict incur responsibility for 
core crimes committed by their subordinates if he or she failed “to take all necessary and rea-
sonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress” them and provided that the 
respective commander knew or ought to have known about them.38 This mode of liability is 
accepted as customary international law in Rule 153 of the ICRC Customary Law Study (Henck-
aerts/Doswald-Beck 2005: 607). How a subordinate must be punished depends on the gravity of 
the crime39 and on what is materially possible.40 However, even for grave crimes, it is, depend-
ing on the capacities of the armed group, not always reasonable to expect a criminal trial. Pre-
Trial Chamber II of the ICC seems to have adopted such a functional approach. It considered 
‘the availability of a functional military judicial system’ and that this system was not properly 
35 For an affirmative answer see Sassòli (2010: 16-17) and Somer (2007: 684).For the opinion that the 
principle of equality of belligerents does not apply to non-international armed conflicts see Doswald-
Beck (2006: 890).
36 For a discussion of the legal consequences of mixed messages (though in another context than here) 
see Nolte/Aust (2009: 1). 
37 In the context of international armed conflict, see Mandel (2011), in particular at page 649 where 
Mandel simply overlooks that an aggressor has no incentive to respect international humanitarian 
law if every act in pursuance of armed conflict is illegal anyway.
38 See also Article 7(3) of the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, annexed 
to UNSC Resolution 827 (25 May 1993) and Article 6(3) Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwan-
da, annexed to UNSC Resolution 955 (8 November 1994).
39 Even where it is materially possible, a criminal trial is not always necessary. An ICTY Trial Chamber 
held that disciplinary punishment was sufficient for pillage: Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović (Judgment) 
IT-01-47-T (15 March 2006), paras. 2056-2058. On the other hand, the Appeals Chamber added that 
a disciplinary sanction not exceeding sixty days would have been insufficient to punish murder and 
cruel treatment; Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović (Judgment) IT-01-47-A (22 April 2008), paras. 149-155.
40 Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo (Decision), above note 16, para. 434.
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used as one aspect leading to a violation of Bemba’s command responsibility.41 Hence, there 
does not seem to be a clear obligation to set up courts, neither on the armed group nor on the 
commander. The Bemba decision may even be a disincentive for armed groups to set up courts 
because then a commander must ensure that subordinates are tried by these courts if that 
commander intends to avoid command responsibility for the subordinates’ crimes.
3. Armed groups’ courts and the ne bis in idem principle
Another argument that could be advanced against armed groups’ courts is the ne bis in idem 
principle. The argument could run as follows: if after a sham trial by a court of an armed 
group, the ne bis in idem principle makes a new trial for the same offence by a state or interna-
tional court illegal,42 this would undermine efforts towards accountability. However, is the ba-
sis for this argument actually correct? Does international law oblige State and/or international 
courts to apply the ne bis in idem principle to trials by armed groups’ courts? The four following 
bodies of law speak against such an obligation.
3.1 International humanitarian law
None of the two instruments that regulate fair trial guarantees in non-international armed 
conflicts (Common Article 3 GC and Article 6 AP II) contain the ne bis in idem principle. Theo-
retically, one could interpret the phrase “judicial guarantees which are recognized as indis-
pensable” to include the ne bis in idem principle. However, this would be an expansive interpre-
tation. First, there is no basis in the travaux préparatoires for such an interpretation. Indeed, the 
European Convention on Human Rights in the form it was originally adopted only a year after 
the Geneva Conventions does not contain a prohibition of double jeopardy. Second, the fair 
trial guarantees enumerated in Additional Protocol II, which do not contain the ne bis in idem 
principle, are used to interpret the meaning of ‘indispensable’ judicial guarantees in Common 
Article 3 GC (Sivakumaran 2009: 501-502). It is arguable, but not without controversy, that the 
ne bis in idem principle applies as a norm of customary international humanitarian law to non-
international armed conflict.43 Assuming, arguendo, that the prohibition of double jeopardy in 
Article 75(4)(h) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (Additional Protocol I, AP I)
41 Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo (Decision), above note 16, para. 501.
42 Peter Rowe makes this point with regard to the ICC (2004: 227).
43 Rule 100 of the ICRC Customary Law Study on fair trials includes the ne bis in idem principle also 
for non-international armed conflicts. However, the Study does not include much (although some) 
practice specifically pointing to such an obligation in non-international armed conflict. It is therefore 
not surprising that the Manual of Non-International Armed Conflict does not include the ne bis in 
idem principle in its list of fair trial guarantees (Dinstein et al. 2006: 51-52). In literature, Article 75 of 
Additional Protocol I is often considered customary international law although this is usually said in 
the context of an international armed conflict. See e.g. Dörmann/Colassis (2004: 323). The opinion of a 
plurality of four US Supreme Court judges in the Hamdan case is not relevant here. This is because the 
plurality only considered the provision of Article 75 of Additional Protocol I customary international 
law ‘that an accused must, absent disruptive conduct or consent, be present for his trial and must be 
privy to the evidence against him’; Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 US 557 (2006), per Stevens J., p. 71 (pinpoint 
as on http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/pdf/05-184P.ZS, last accessed 21 September 2012).
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applies as custom to non-international armed conflicts, it will not apply to trials conducted 
by the adverse party. This clearly follows from the ordinary meaning of the Article: “[N]o one 
shall be prosecuted or punished by the same Party for an offence in respect of which a final 
judgment acquitting or convicting that person has been previously pronounced under the 
same law and judicial procedure.”44 Hence, international humanitarian law does not prohibit 
trials by a State or international criminal court for an offence which was already adjudicated 
by a court of an armed group.
3.2 Customary international criminal law
In theory, an obligation of States to apply the principle of double jeopardy to trials by armed 
groups could have developed as a rule of customary international law from national criminal 
procedures or cases. Unsurprisingly, however, there is no significant amount of State practice 
to confirm this45 and many States do not even recognize that the ne bis in idem principle applies 
to trials conducted in other States.46 The Italian delegate to the discussion on the item “Draft 
Code of Offences against Peace and Security of Mankind” explained why: 
“[O]utside some bilateral or limited multilateral circles of States, there is not 
sufficient trust in the administration of justice by other States, especially when 
offences with political aspects are concerned. States are concerned that a person 
having committed a heinous crime against peace and security of mankind might 
find protection from prosecution in the rest of the world in an acquittal or a mild 
sentence given in a given State for reasons of political sympathy.”47
Another rationale for not applying the prohibition of double jeopardy in international con-
texts is the sovereign right of a State (provided the State has jurisdiction) to try a suspect on 
its territory. If a State declined to conduct a trial because another State has already done so, 
this would undermine the former State’s sovereignty (van den Wyngaert/Stessens 1999: 782). 
The above-mentioned arguments apply a fortiori to trials conducted by armed groups because 
States are very well entitled to assert their sovereignty over such groups and do not trust them. 
However, many States make use of the so-called Anrechnungsprinzip (the principle of deduction) 
meaning that a prison sentence already served for the same offence (or conduct) in another 
44 The ICRC implicitly confirms this interpretation. See Sandoz et al. (1987: 884).
45 States have of course discretion to recognize the judgments of unrecognized entities. Following the 
defeat of the Southern Confederate States in the American Civil War the Supreme Court developed a 
test according to which certain acts not “in furtherance of the [Confederate] rebellion” continued to 
be valid: Texas v. White, 74 US 700, 733 (1868). 
46 See State practice quoted in van den Wyngaert/Stessens (1999: 783ff); Antonio Cassese also holds that 
while the internal ne bis in idem principle is a rule of customary international law, it does not apply 
to trials in different States. However, he argues that such “a customary rule is arguably evolving, at 
least with regard to international crimes.” He concedes, however, that he can only cite “vertical” practice 
on the relations between international and national courts (Cassese 2003: 319-321).
47 Tullio Treves, Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly (XLII session), 10 November 
1987, reproduced in M. Gestri et al (1996: 196-197). 
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State is deduced from the sentence awarded in the second trial. This principle should also be 
applied to sentences imposed by armed groups’ courts.
3.3 Human rights law
That most States do not apply the prohibition of double jeopardy to previous trials by other 
States (and a fortiori not to previous trials by armed groups) is in conformity with human rights 
law. In light of the focus on Africa, the African Charter for Human and Peoples’ Rights and 
the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) are applicable. Whilst the 
African Charter does not contain a prohibition of double jeopardy, Article 14(7) ICCPR reads: 
“No one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already 
been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each 
country.” Although the text is ambiguous, the reference to “each country” only makes proper 
sense if understood to mean that the person may not be tried again under the jurisdiction of 
the same State.48 The Human Rights Committee shares this interpretation and considers new 
trials in States other than that of the first trial to be in accordance with Article 14(7) ICCPR.49
3.4 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Finally, is the ICC obliged to apply the prohibition of double jeopardy in relation to trials by 
armed groups? The relevant paragraph, Article 20(3) of the ICC Statute reads as follows:
“No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under 
Article 6, 7 or 8 shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct unless 
the proceedings in the other court:
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal respon-
sibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with 
the norms of due process recognized by international law and were conducted in a 
manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the 
person concerned to justice.”
The term ‘(an)other court’ in the chapeau of this paragraph on so-called ‘upward’ ne bis in idem 
(i.e. first trial national court, second trial ICC) could by its ordinary meaning apply to armed 
48 The German translation refers to “jeweiligen Landes” and hence supports this point (although Ger-
man is not one of the authentic languages).
49 A.P. v. Italy, (204/1986), Human Rights Committee, 1990, UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/2 at 67: “The Commit-
tee observes that this provision prohibits double jeopardy only with regard to an offence adjudicated 
in a given State.” (Ibid., para. 7.3) The Committee confirmed this interpretation in A.R.J. v. Australia, 
Human Rights Committee, 11 August 1997, UN Doc. CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996. Again, the Committee 
repeated its interpretation in General Comment 32 but added that this should not “undermine ef-
forts by States to prevent retrial for the same criminal offence through international conventions.” 
General Comment on Article 14: The Right to Equality before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair 
Trial (General Comment 32), Human Rights Committee, 24 July 2007, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32, para. 
57. Manfred Nowak criticized this approach as “fairly general and too absolute” (2005: 356).
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groups’ courts.50 However, many delegations at the 1998 Rome Conference implicitly did not 
share such an interpretation (e.g. by referring to ‘national’ courts).51 Moreover, participants 
never discussed whether a trial by a court of an armed group could trigger the ne bis in idem 
principle.52 Since many States do not apply the prohibition of double jeopardy to previous tri-
als by other States, one would at least have expected a discussion about the even more contro-
versial application of the principle to trials conducted by armed groups. At any rate, even if 
Article 20(3) of the ICC Statute applied to judgments by armed groups’ courts, an armed group 
could not use this to shield a person from jurisdiction. Article 20(3) foresees a new trial based 
on the same conduct in case the previous trial was unfair or meant to protect the defendant 
from prosecution.
The second sentence of Article 78(2) ICC Statute states that the ICC “may deduct any time oth-
erwise spent in detention in connection with conduct underlying the crime.” The phrase “oth-
erwise spent in detention” is sufficiently broad to include prison sentences ordered by armed 
groups’ courts. It is indeed regrettable that the deduction of sentence is only discretionary (van 
den Wyngaert/Ogena 2002: 742; Finlay 2009: 242-243). 
To sum up, international or regional ne bis in idem standards in the constellations relevant for 
Africa do not prohibit that persons already tried by a court of an armed group are retried in a 
State’s court or via international jurisdiction. This is somewhat ambiguous in the case of the 
ICC but the ICC may retry persons whose previous processes were unfair or a sham. Hence, if 
courts of armed groups try persons with the intention to shield them from prosecution, they 
can subsequently still be held accountable.
4. Implementation of humanitarian law by armed groups’ courts
So far this paper dealt with the legal questions relevant for the role of armed groups’ courts as 
a tool for implementation. Let us now move to the contribution of armed groups’ courts to the 
enforcement of humanitarian law from a more empirical point of view.
4.1 The priorities of courts established by African armed groups
There is only a small sample of armed groups that operated courts in Africa whose penal 
codes on military matters are available to the public. For example, Bemba’s Mouvement de 
Libération du Congo (1998-2002) had courts but did not have a publicly available penal code. 
Others, such as the Revolutionary United Front in Sierra Leone (1991-2002) only have brief 
50 This also seems to be the basis of Peter Rowe’s conclusion (2004: 227).
51 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an Internation-
al Criminal Court, Official Records, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/13 (Vol. II), p. 73 (Mr. Muladi, Indonesia), 
p. 214 (Mr. Holmes, Canada), p. 215 (Mr. Corthout, Belgium). Recourse to the preparatory works may 
be had because the ordinary meaning is ambiguous. Article 32(a) Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.
52 Ibid.
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codes of conduct and not a proper penal code. The only African armed groups with publicized 
penal codes were: the former armed wing of the African National Congress (ANC) (1961-1990),53 
Museveni’s former National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda (1981-1986) and the Sudanese 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) in South Sudan (1983-2011).
Except for some provisions not directly related to fighting, such as political education, the 
codes established by these former armed groups are mandatory. Therein mainly two types of 
laws are distinguishable: rules designed to protect individuals (including international hu-
manitarian law) and, much more prominently, provisions aimed at enhancing the military 
capacity of the armed group. The rules on defections, desertions, disrespect for officers and 
mutiny are the greatest in number and sophistication, at least with regard to the SPLA and 
NRA.54 Before independence, the SPLM/A in South Sudan already had 33 sophisticated laws. 
This includes the SPLA Act from 2003 with all sorts of rules on military discipline (e.g. insub-
ordinate behaviour, intoxication, malingering) and procedural laws (composition, convening, 
powers, sentence of court martial; procedure in case of concurrent jurisdiction; oath by wit-
nesses). Of almost 130 paragraphs, there is only one that in part contains rules on the protec-
tion of individuals. It somewhat vaguely penalizes pillage and “cruel, indecent and unnatural” 
behaviour.55 The annexed SPLA Code of Conduct contains more rules on good relations with 
the public, but they are not criminalized.56 Similarly, the NRA had a very basic code of conduct 
and a much more elaborate operational code of conduct. The operational code of conduct al-
most exclusively contained offences concerned with loyalty and commitment, such as leaking 
of operational information, mutiny, desertion and cowardice in action which were all very 
broadly defined.57 Only the offence of “undermining the relationship with the civilian popula-
tion” comprised rules for the protections of civilians.58
53 Though not necessarily all activities of the armed wing of the ANC were governed by international 
humanitarian law, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission considered that the ANC was in an 
armed conflict with South Africa to which humanitarian law applied (TRC 1998: chapter 4). Before 
the end of apartheid the ANC was also considered a national liberation movement. Since South 
Africa only acceded to Additional Protocol I in 1995, it is not clear whether the ANC had been such 
a movement in the sense of Article 1(4) AP I. This would only have been the case if Article 1(4) AP I 
and Article 96(3) AP I had been customary international law at the time of ANC’s armed struggle. 
Antonio Cassese argued that this was indeed the case, but conceded that South Africa was not bound 
because it did not participate at the Diplomatic Conference preceding the adoption of the Protocols 
(1984: 70-71). Even if South Africa were bound, the ANC’s vague declaration did not formally give 
it the status of a national liberation movement in the sense of Article 1(4) AP I. Article 96(3) AP I 
requires that the declaration of adherence to the Geneva Conventions is deposited with the Swiss 
Federal Council, but the latter refused to accept the deposit. It is for these reasons adequate to refer 
to the ANC’s armed wing as an armed group.
54 Umkhonto We Sizwe Military Code of the ANC released 1985; The SPLA Act 2003; both in Bangerter 
(forthcoming); Code of Conduct of the National Resistance Army, Legal Notice No. 1 (23 August 1986); 
Operational Code of Conduct of the National Resistance Army, Legal Notice No. 1 (23 August 1986). 
Although published only after the NRA took over the power in Uganda, the Code of Conduct and the 
Operational Code were already in force before when the NRA still acted as an armed group. See e.g. 
Kasfir (2005: 284). 
55 The SPLA Act 2003, Chapter V, above note 54, paras. 33(f ), 33(g).
56 Code of Conduct for the SPLA, above note 54, para. 1-2.
57 NRA Operational Code of Conduct, above note 54, part III.
58 Ibid., part III, para. 12.
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The codes of conduct only contain very basic rules of international humanitarian law such 
as the prohibition to kill the adversary in custody59 and the prohibition to pillage civilians.60 
Very importantly, all three of them prohibit attacks against civilians.61 The ANC and the NRA 
prohibited rape explicitly,62 whereas the SPLA did so implicitly.63 However, none of the codes 
prohibits the conscription of child soldiers. 
Any conclusions derived from the codes have to be treated with caution, as it may well be that 
the codes are not properly enforced in the actual practice of armed groups. However, informa-
tion on this actual practice of armed groups’ courts is particularly scarce. There do not seem 
to be any written judgments by armed groups’ courts, at least none that are public. However, 
there is some indication on the basis of NGO reports that armed groups’ courts were very 
much resolved to enforce military discipline, loyalty, bravery and cohesion within the armed 
group. For example, an SPLA court martial sentenced 33 of its members to death for refusing 
an ambush (HRW 1994: 327-328). At the same time, the SPLA did not hold its members account-
able for violations of international humanitarian law during combat including indiscriminate 
shootings of civilians, looting and burning of civilian belongings. The SPLA record for non-
combat related offences was mixed and allegedly varied depending on the ethnic origin of 
the defendant (HRW 1994: 330-331). The ANC sentenced persons to death suspected of mutiny 
(TRC 1998: paras. 153-158). Its members including commanders routinely tortured suspected 
spies without being held accountable (TRC 1998: paras. 159-180). However, it has also been 
reported that murder and rape were punished with the death penalty (TRC 1998: para. 158).
It seems fair to say that the courts were primarily intended to establish and maintain military 
discipline, loyalty, bravery and cohesion within the armed group. Ultimately, therefore, they 
were meant to enhance the military capacity of the armed group and only to a lesser degree 
to implement international humanitarian law. However, the lack of humanitarian law in the 
codes of the NRA and ANC – both from the mid 1980’s – can also be explained by the lacking 
criminalization of humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflicts at the 
time. The last version of the SPLA Act, however, is from 2003 when many international crimi-
nal law rules were already accepted as customary. At any rate, it should also be borne in mind 
that military discipline may well favour compliance with humanitarian law. Only through 
military discipline can the observance of the rules for the protection of the individual be en-
sured among the lower ranks. 
59 ANC Military Code, General Regulations, para. 3(h); Code of Conduct for the SPLA, para. 2(h); NRA 
Code of Conduct, para. 4, all above note 54.
60 ANC Military Code, General Regulations, para. 3(b); Code of Conduct for the SPLA, para. 2(b); NRA 
Code of Conduct, para. 11(iv), all above note 54.
61 ANC Military Code, General Regulations, para. 3(e); Code of Conduct for the SPLA, para. 2(a); NRA 
Code of Conduct, para. 1, all above note 54.
62 ANC Military Code, General Regulations, para. 3(e); NRA Operational Code of Conduct, part III, 
para. 12, all above note 54. 
63 The prohibition of rape falls under the prohibition to “abuse, insult, shout at, beat or in any way an-
noy any member of the public.” Code of Conduct for the SPLA, above note 54, para. 2(a).
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4.2 The level of compliance with humanitarian law by armed groups having courts
The subject of the last subchapter was whether the leadership of the three armed groups un-
der discussion intended to implement humanitarian law. But what was the actual degree of 
compliance with international humanitarian law (other than fair trial guarantees) of the ANC, 
NRA and SPLA? None of these three former armed groups under discussion attained a level of 
compliance that is fully satisfactory. All even violated basic prohibitions in Common Article 
3 GC and other Geneva law provisions. The ANC was particularly harsh with suspected spies 
and tortured them (TRC 1998: paras. 158-180). The NRA64 and SPLA65 tortured and made use 
of child soldiers.66 However, all of them showed a degree of respect for civilians that compares 
favourably to the outright disrespect for humanitarian law by other armed groups that are 
primarily made up of child soldiers and that commit systematic and widespread atrocities 
against the whole civilian population: mass rapes, burning down of entire villages, murder 
and often mutilations.67 In comparison, the SPLA, NRA and ANC were more disciplined, pur-
sued discernible military objectives and used violence against civilians more selectively.68
Is this all due to the courts? There is a methodological problem for this claim because it can-
not be ascertained whether other factors than the courts are determinative for a higher stand-
ard of compliance. In fact, if a responsible leadership installs courts to genuinely prosecute 
violations of international humanitarian law, it is quite likely to also take other measures that 
are apt to lead to a higher degree of compliance, such as careful recruitment, training and 
close supervision of subordinates. 
64 The NRA introduced a severe torture method called Kandoya to Uganda in the early 1980s whereby 
the elbows are tightly tied behind the back. It causes damage to the neuromuscular function of the 
upper limbs; victims of Kandoya report extreme weakness in the upper arms and cannot work manu-
ally (IRCT 2004). There are various personal accounts of former child soldiers forcibly recruited and 
used by the NRA. For a summary of the account of China Keitetsi see Meshberg (2007). The account 
of Kassim Ouma abducted at the age of five and forced to torture is subject of the film ‘Kassim the 
Dream’ and is summarized by Großekathöfer (2007). After the NRA consolidated its power in Ugan-
da, human rights organizations started to interest themselves for the continuing violations (AI 1991). 
65 HRW 1994: 195-218, 226-227; HRW 2009: 3, 24, 38. 
66 It is not entirely clear, however, whether there was a customary prohibition to use child soldiers in 
1986 when operations of the NRA as an armed group ended.
67 Two of the most infamous examples for this sort of armed group are the Lord’s Resistance Army 
(LRA) as it is currently behaving and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Mutilations of civilians 
by the latter are well documented. Whilst the Lord’s Resistance Army was not always as violent as it 
is presently, it engages at the time of writing in extremely cruel practices that have not been reported 
about the SPLA, NRA and ANC. Such practices include hacking unarmed civilians to death or forc-
ing children to do so. Many armed groups will compare favourably to the Revolutionary United Front 
and the current Lord’s Resistance Army, but even when the comparator spectrum is broadened, the 
three armed groups under discussion are among those that commit less humanitarian law viola-
tions. In that regard, Jeremy Weinstein compares the NRA to the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana 
(RENAMO) and finds that the NRA shows more respect for civilians and their property. He argues 
that this is due to the NRA’s lack of resources which meant that members were more strongly com-
mitted to the NRA’s cause than the opportunistic joiners of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana. 
Though Weinstein’s thesis may be part of the explanation, it is plausible that the NRA’s courts also 
played a role (2005: 609-614); Human Rights Watch found that “[s]ome observers rate the SPLA fac-
tions as more disciplined than many other African insurgents” – although it rightly added that “this 
[was] not an acceptable standard.” (HRW 1994: 330).
68 ANC: Lodge (1987: 11, fn. 37); SPLA: Kok (1996: 599); NRA: Weinstein (2005: 612); Kasfir (2005).
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The SPLA, ANC and NRA continuously pursued political goals and were ultimately successful 
in achieving them. In light of these aspirations, these groups needed to show that their power 
was to the local population’s advantage, giving their leaders good reasons to ensure compara-
tively high respect for civilians. Hence, it would be an overstatement to explain the higher 
degree of discipline and respect for international humanitarian law exclusively by their opera-
tion of courts. However, it is plausible to assume that the courts were one factor that helped the 
leadership to install more discipline and a relatively high respect for the civilian population.
4.3 The potential of armed groups’ courts to implement humanitarian law
The potential of a court of an armed group to implement humanitarian law depends largely 
on the armed group’s current normative views. A court is only a means to enforce a certain 
prescribed behaviour, a behaviour which might – depending on the ‘law’ of the armed group 
– be incompatible with international humanitarian law. In other words, armed groups’ courts 
are more likely to be a means rather than the cause for higher compliance.
However, where the leadership of an armed group is willing to enforce international humani-
tarian law, the potential of armed groups’ courts to do so is comparatively high. Sanctions 
imposed by the armed group are likely to be more effective than sanctions by States or inter-
national criminal tribunals. This is because sanctions by armed groups are immediate, more 
visible to other members of the armed group and installed by an institution which mem-
bers of the armed group respect. Moreover, the deterrent effect of such sanctions may well be 
stronger because any member of the armed group knows that the punishment may also be 
applied to them. Fighters of armed groups will usually be within the reach of the sanctioning 
system of the armed group, whereas they will in most cases not be within the direct reach of 
State or international prosecution authorities. 
Apart from being more effective, armed groups’ courts may also be the only reasonably avail-
able forum for prosecution. An armed group is very unlikely to be willing to transfer its sus-
pects to the State against which it fights. An armed group might also be unwilling to hand 
the person over to another State and in many cases no other State might even wish to open 
an investigation. International courts are not an option for prosecuting low ranking fighters, 
due to jurisdictional and resource limitations (Sivakumaran 2009: 510). Pre-Trial Chamber II 
of the ICC has implicitly taken the same view. In its Amicus Curiae Observations, Amnesty 
International argued that Bemba was obliged to submit the violations allegedly committed by 
his subordinates to a State court or the ICC.69 When dealing with the command responsibil-
ity of Bemba, Pre-Trial Chamber II did not entertain that possibility. However, it affirmed 
command responsibility inter alia on the basis that Bemba did not use the judicial system of 
the MLC.70 Thus, it considered a trial by an MLC court more plausible than a trial by a State 
jurisdiction.
69 Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo (Amicus Curiae), above note 15, paras. 21-25.
70 Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo (Decision), above note 16, para. 501.
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Often, the only feasible alternative for the armed groups is to punish an offender without 
court trial. This would be a viable option in case of small disciplinary infractions which at-
tract lenient punishments. However, a lenient penalty would not be sufficient in case of se-
rious violations of humanitarian law where a penalty must be adequate to avoid command 
responsibility.71 Since serious crimes require a severe penalty, they should be adjudicated in a 
fair trial and not administratively. But do courts of armed groups offer fair trial guarantees?
5. Fair trial guarantees 
Why are fair trial guarantees even relevant for the question whether armed groups’ courts can 
be a tool for implementation? Admittedly, even an unfair trial may still enforce international 
humanitarian law effectively. However, the violation of due process guarantees undermines 
such contributions to implementation. In other words, if enforcing a humanitarian law rule 
means the violation of another such rule, the net humanitarian impact of the enforcement is 
questionable.
Fair trial guarantees in humanitarian law of non-international armed conflict72 apply only to 
“criminal offences related to the armed conflict.”73 Thus, in practice, such fair trial guarantees 
will be most relevant for trials of ‘fighters’.74 It is less likely that humanitarian law of non-
international armed conflict applies to trials of civilians,75 although it would apply if a civilian 
is accused of spying, for example. In case due process guarantees laid down in humanitarian 
law are not applicable, the question whether human rights law applies is most relevant. It has 
been noted above that there is a growing consensus that armed groups in control of territory 
exercising quasi-governmental functions are bound by human rights law.76 Even if only per-
emptory human rights norms were applicable to armed groups, fair trial guarantees would in 
the opinion of the Human Rights Committee be covered by this definition.77
71 In the Hadžihasanović Appeals Chamber Judgment (above note 39, para. 152) disciplinary punish-
ment of a maximum of sixty days was not considered sufficient in light of the gravity of the crime of 
murder.
72 These are in essence Common Article 3(1)(d) GC and Article 6 AP II. For an excellent interpretation 
of fair trial guarantees applicable to armed groups’ courts see Sivakumaran (2009: 500-509).
73 Explicitly, Article 6 AP II. The application of international humanitarian law more generally presup-
poses a link to the armed conflict which follows from its conditions of application more generally 
and which has been affirmed by international criminal tribunals on a number of occasions, e.g. 
Prosecutor v. Milutinovic (Judgment) IT-05-87-T (26 February 2009), paras. 127-128. 
74 In non-international armed conflict fair trial guarantees also apply to persons tried by the armed 
group of which they are members. See Sivakumaran (2012). I am also grateful to Jean-Marie Henck-
aerts, Krisztina Huszti-Orban, Jelena Pejic, Marco Sassòli, Jonathan Somer and Cornelius Wiesener 
for sharing their views with me on this issue.
75 In the territory under occupation in the course of an international armed conflict, the occupying 
power must guarantee a fair trial to every accused including civilians (Article 71 Geneva Convention 
IV). For the opinion that some rules of the law of occupation could also apply to non-international 
armed conflicts see Fleck (2008: 628). 
76 See above note 18 and corresponding text.
77 General Comment on States of Emergency (General Comment 29), Human Rights Committee, 31 
August 2001, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 which states that peremptory norms include ‘funda-
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5.1 Fair trial guarantees granted by courts of African armed groups 
Whilst some penal codes of armed groups in Africa contain a penal procedure, many impor-
tant due process guarantees are missing.78 It is therefore not surprising that armed groups’ 
courts have often been criticized for not respecting due process guarantees. The criticism of 
the MLC has been mentioned above.79 The Truth and Reconciliation Commission held that 
court martials of the ANC were flawed and until 1986 were held without any legal representa-
tion of the defendants (TRC 1998: 352). The courts that operate in SPLA-held territory have 
serious faults, but judges had started to emancipate themselves more and more from the SPLA 
even before Southern Sudan attained statehood (HRW 2009: 32).80 Admittedly, courts in South-
ern Sudan after 2005 were not in all aspects representative for armed groups’ courts anymore. 
This is because they received support from the UN and were tolerated by the North after the 
SPLA signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Nevertheless, it is an example that shows 
that courts are able to slowly become independent from an armed group that controls the 
court’s area of jurisdiction and hence fulfill a very important requirement for a fair trial.
5.2 The capability of courts by armed groups to respect fair trial guarantees 
Insufficient fair trial guarantees have been an issue with armed groups’ courts. This raises the 
more general question of whether armed groups’ courts are generally unable or unwilling to 
conduct fair trials.
Regarding their ability, most armed groups, in particular less organized ones, have less poten-
tial than States to guarantee a fair trial. Inability to conduct a fair trial is likely owed to a lack 
of resources of an armed group. Armed groups have to devote a lot of their existing resources 
to their military since States usually try to defeat armed groups on their territory. Foreign 
States and the UN are in most cases not willing to provide aid in order to improve the judici-
ary of armed groups.81 
It can also be doubted whether leaders of armed groups are in all cases willing to observe due 
process guarantees. They are likely to see their courts as an instrument to implement their 
policy and are therefore likely to interfere with the trials. However, armed groups are more 
likely to be willing to conduct a fair trial in humanitarian law cases than in those concern-
ing mutiny, defections or spying. The passing of sensitive military information to the enemy 
mental principles of fair trial, including the presumption of innocence’. 
78 This is particularly striking in the penal code of the SPLA that has detailed procedural provisions 
but no right to a defence counsel, for example. SPLA Act 2003 in Bangerter (forthcoming).
79 See above note 6 and corresponding text.
80 It is already a sign of growing independence of judges that they take action against SPLA soldiers 
(even though the judges’ decisions are often not carried out).
81 This does not necessarily apply for more consolidated de facto regimes like Somaliland. UNDP in 
Somalia, Judiciary Strengthened as First Batch of Judges Graduate from Legal Training, http://www.
so.undp.org/index.php/Somalia-Stories/Judiciary-strengthened-as-first-batch-of-judges-graduate-
from-legal-training.html, last accessed 21 September 2012.
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may seriously endanger the survival of the armed group, whereas a violation of international 
humanitarian law by its own members will usually not have this effect. It is simply less risky 
to provide for a fair trial (which may result in an acquittal) to suspected humanitarian law of-
fenders than to those that are suspected of not being loyal to the armed group.
6. Empirical legitimacy of armed groups
Closely connected to loyalty is empirical legitimacy.82 Indeed, according to Max Weber em-
pirical legitimacy is the perceived obligation of the governed to follow a particular authority. 
Weber observed relationships of legitimacy not only between the authority and the population 
but also between the authority and its administration (Weber 2005: 158-159).83 Transposed to 
our case empirical legitimacy denotes that the armed group’s members feel obliged to follow 
the armed group’s leadership. In case an armed group also seeks to rule over the local popula-
tion empirical legitimacy also means that the local population perceives a duty to follow the 
rule of the armed group. 
What is the effect of courts on this? Do courts of an armed group increase the empirical le-
gitimacy of that armed group? Courts can help to secure justice and security, which are widely 
shared social goals,84 often directly associated with legitimate institutions (Bakonyi/Stuvøy 
2005: 374). This is not only the case for the OECD countries but also in many traditional Afri-
can and South-American societies where so-called Chiefs apply the local customary law. In the 
Islamic world, Sharia courts are also a means to assert legitimacy. So if armed groups operate 
courts and if in the eyes of the local population these courts contribute to more justice, this is 
likely to increase an armed group’s empirical legitimacy.85 
Does it matter if armed groups manage to increase their empirical legitimacy? Higher empiri-
cal legitimacy of an armed group in the eyes of the local population is above all problematic 
82 I am indebted to Zeljko Branović, Anke Draude and Cord Schmelzle for discussing different con-
cepts of legitimacy with me and for providing comments on this section.
83 Max Weber’s sociology of domination or authority laid the foundations for the empirical concept of 
legitimacy that is still favoured by political scientists and sociologists today. In contrast, political 
theorists and philosophers regard legitimacy not as the perceived but as the actual normative status 
of a political order which can in their view be impartially determined (Schmelzle 2011: 7). It seems 
that most law scholars use the term ‘legitimacy’ in the normative sense closely connected to legality 
(Sivakumaran 2009: 509-511). For a definition with empirical elements on the legitimacy of interna-
tional law, an issue beyond this article, see Franck (1990: 24).
84 Aside from the sharing of social goals between the governance actor and the governance addressee, 
Schmelzle identifies three more conditions under which the effective delivery of governance leads to 
higher empirical legitimacy: the governance addressee must hold an instrumental legitimacy belief 
(i.e. believe that effectiveness leads to legitimacy), associate the governance service with the govern-
ance actor and generalize the specific support for a policy into general support for the governance 
actor (2011: 13-15). Schmelzle did not call the second to last condition ‘association’ but ‘transparency’. 
However, in my view it is sufficient that a governance actor is somehow associated with the govern-
ance service, rightly or wrongly, based on transparency or propaganda. It is fair to assume that these 
conditions are often met in areas of limited statehood.
85 Justice is also often said to be necessary for normative legitimacy (Keohane 2007: 6).
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for the State on the territory of which the armed group operates. The State loses the loyalty 
of its population. Ultimately, empirical legitimacy is an important factor – among many oth-
ers – that may lead to the recognition of secession,86 but this is rare and only possible for well 
consolidated entities. Since the overall administration of justice vis-à-vis the civilian popula-
tion is associated with legitimacy in many societies, States oppose courts by armed groups on 
their territory. On the other hand, States may more readily accept the judicial enforcement 
of international humanitarian law vis-à-vis the members of the armed group.87 Any club in a 
peaceful society may sanction the violation of its norms for example by dismissing members. 
Although sanctions by armed groups go further than that, this has less implications for the 
legitimacy of the territorial State than cases where courts judge over civilians and seriously 
‘out-administer’ the State.
 
The international community88 is interested in stability, in not being associated with armed 
groups that systematically violate basic norms granting the protection of individuals and (in 
particular OECD States) in the protection of their nationals. Thus, the international com-
munity is opposed to the legitimization of armed groups that cooperate with transnational 
terrorist networks or which systematically disregard basic norms for the protection of indi-
viduals. Where an armed group does not fall under either of these categories, the international 
community may be willing to accept that it gains empirical legitimacy in order to prevent 
chaos. 
Concerning the local population, it is easily understood that higher empirical legitimacy by 
definition leads to higher compliance (Levi/Sacks 2009: 314). If the members of armed groups 
comply with the leadership of an armed group and if the leadership is committed to inter-
national humanitarian law, an armed group’s higher empirical legitimacy may be in favour 
of the population. If the population generally succumbs to the armed group’s rule, this may 
mean stability and hence more security from ordinary criminals, too (Sivakumaran 2009: 
509-510). However, the price paid for such stability may be high. The Taliban and Al Shabab 
enforce their law and order. Their sanctions often abuse human rights (although they are more 
foreseeable than violence in more chaotic circumstances). It should not be overlooked, how-
ever, that it would be very difficult for an armed group to gain empirical legitimacy if its 
norms were diametrically opposed to those of the local population. Hence, in order to acquire 
empirical legitimacy an armed group will have to show some degree of respect for the popula-
tion’s normative views unless it manages to fundamentally change them over time.
86 Consent by the seceding State’s population as a form of empirical legitimacy is an essential criterion 
for the international community to accept the creation of a new State. The respect for a minimum of 
human rights and democratic principles as a form of normative legitimacy are also relevant.
87 Weber held that legitimacy could also be observed between the leader and its administration (2005: 
158-159), here: the leadership of the armed group and its members. 
88 The term is used here to refer to the interests that are shared among the majority of international 
actors. For a good discussion of the term see Paulus/Simma (1998). 
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7. Conclusion: How should the international community react?
Summing up the arguments regarding the question whether or not armed groups’ courts can 
be effective tools for implementation, an essential condition is met: International humanitar-
ian law and human rights law do not prohibit the operation of such courts. Moreover, the pro-
hibition of double jeopardy does not impede subsequent accountability in case armed groups’ 
courts conducted unfair or sham trials. Their courts increase the empirical legitimacy of the 
armed group, but this may – depending on the norms that the armed group enforces – have 
advantages for the local population such as higher compliance with international humanitar-
ian law. If the leadership is genuinely willing to enforce humanitarian law, armed groups’ 
courts have a relatively high potential to be a successful tool for implementation. Whilst the 
armed group’s courts discussed were mostly concerned with military discipline, they also en-
forced rules that protect individuals. The armed groups under scrutiny committed serious 
humanitarian law violations including violations of due process guarantees, but they showed 
more respect for civilians than many armed groups without courts. So, it would seem that 
armed groups’ courts can be a tool for implementation, but one that is far from perfect.
What can be done to improve the situation? Opening up the dialogue with armed groups that 
possess courts comes to mind. Where important humanitarian law or fair trial provisions 
are missing in the penal codes, it may for example be possible to persuade the armed group 
to insert them. Such dialogue could also improve the level of ‘ownership’ of the armed group 
over international law norms and hence improve the compliance record of the armed group 
(Sivakumaran 2009: 512-513). 
It has been claimed that engaging with armed groups’ courts would legitimize them.89 How-
ever, the effect of international involvement on empirical legitimacy depends largely on how 
society regards communication with and influence of a particular external actor and on the 
perceived degree of influence of these external actors. Armed groups may often be able to 
shape the population’s belief about what is legitimate. It would be odd if armed groups tried to 
present their relations with international actors as a source of their legitimacy as they would 
make themselves dependent on actors beyond their control. In fact, armed groups are much 
more likely to rely on charismatic or traditional forms of legitimacy or to gain legitimacy 
through effectiveness.90 It is also hard to see how the international involvement of an armed 
group could in itself increase its normative legitimacy. Contact with external actors is not in-
herently moral. However, the possible consequence of such interaction in the form of a higher 
standard of justice and security would enhance its normative and probably also empirical 
legitimacy. 
89 Sandesh Sivakumaran, who considers that armed groups’ courts have the potential to be a tool for 
implementation, makes this point, but his underlying understanding of legitimacy is apparently 
broader (2009: 512). 
90 For the example of UNITA see Bakonyi/Stuvøy (2005: 370).
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What is often meant by ‘legitimacy’ is the entitlement to govern as perceived by international 
actors (‘international entitlement’). It is true that dialogue with armed groups can lead to in-
ternational entitlement. However, this point should not be overstated, either. Is it realistic that 
an armed group is taken from a terrorist list because an impartial humanitarian organiza-
tion involves it in a dialogue about certain issues? The reverse is more likely, i.e. that the State 
prohibits the activities of the humanitarian organization. States make their own judgments 
about the entitlement of an actor to govern and do not rely on whether non-governmental 
organizations or the UN involved them.91 NGOs and the UN often involve actors irrespective 
of the actor’s deeds or normative views and hence even involvement does not mean any form 
of approval. 
Somalia is an extreme example which indicates that attempts to only involve States at the 
expense of non-state actors is not always a viable option. It would be absurd to ignore Somali-
land’s courts only because it is not recognized as State. After all, the relatively well-consoli-
dated de facto regime Somaliland is in a better position to install justice and security than the 
seriously threatened rump State of Somalia. 
91 See US Patriot Act and subsequent proceedings held constitutional in Holder v. Humanitarian Law 
Project 130 S Ct 2705 (2010).
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